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ABSTRACT 
 
This work presents new evidence on the effect of husbands’ health insurance on wives’ labor 
supply. Previous cross-sectional studies have estimated a significant negative effect of spousal 
coverage on wives’ labor supply. However, these estimates potentially suffer from bias due to 
the simultaneity of wives’ labor supply and the health insurance status of their husbands. This 
paper attempts to obtain consistent estimates by using several panel data methods. In particular, 
the likely correlation between unobserved personal characteristics of husbands and wives—such 
as preferences for work—and potential joint job choice decisions can be controlled by using 
panel data on intact marriages. The findings, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth and the Current Population Survey, suggest that the negative effect of spousal coverage 
on labor supply found in cross-sections results mainly from spousal sorting and selection. Once 
unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for, a relatively smaller estimated effect of spousal 
coverage on wives’ labor supply remains. 
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1. Introduction 
Employment-based health insurance coverage is the most common form of health 
insurance in the United States: in 2006, 62.2 percent of nonelderly individuals and 70.9 
percent of nonelderly workers were covered by employer-provided health insurance (Fronstin 
2007). The issue of health insurance being tied to employment in the U.S. health care system 
has received much attention from both policymakers and researchers. Accordingly, a 
substantial body of research has been devoted to examining the relationship between health 
insurance and various labor market decisions, including labor force participation, hours 
worked, job mobility, and retirement (see the reviews by Currie and Madrian 1999; Gruber 
2000; and Gruber and Madrian 2004). 
One important group whose labor force outcomes are likely to be affected by the 
availability of health insurance coverage is married women.  Because employers who provide 
health insurance often provide it to both employees and their families, many married women 
receive health insurance coverage through their husbands (Madrian 2006). This availability 
of alternative health insurance may reduce wives’ demand for insurance in their own name 
and therefore affect their labor market decisions. 
In the past decade, a number of studies have examined the relationship between 
husbands’ health insurance and wives’ labor supply (Buchmueller and Valletta 1999; Olson 
1998, 2000; and Wellington and Cobb-Clark 2000). Using cross-sectional data and 
estimating reduced-form labor supply equations for wives, they estimate that husbands’ 
health insurance has significant negative effects on their wives’ labor supply. However, these 
cross-sectional estimates potentially suffer from bias because of the simultaneity of wives’ 
labor supply and the health insurance status of their husbands.  
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There are two main reasons for husbands’ health insurance to be endogenous to the 
labor supply decisions of married women. First, unobserved personal characteristics of 
husbands and wives that affect labor supply—such as preferences for work—might be 
correlated because of the marriage selection process (Lundberg 1988). For example, if 
women with strong preferences for leisure, child rearing, or home production tend to marry 
men who work long hours and hence provide health insurance to the family, then cross-
sectional regressions of wives’ labor supply on spousal coverage would overstate the 
negative effect of spousal coverage. 
A second possible source of endogeneity is that husbands and wives may make joint 
job-choice decisions determined by the health insurance options available to the family 
(Black 2000; Scott, Berger, and Black 1989). For example, because coverage rates typically 
increase with firm size,1 husbands may sort into larger firms or into industries—such as the 
manufacturing or the public sector—that are more likely to provide health insurance 
coverage to their workers.2 Again, this sorting behavior would lead the cross-sectional 
estimates to overstate the negative effect of spousal coverage. 
This paper attempts to avoid some of the limitations of earlier empirical work, which 
likely estimates a spurious negative relationship between spousal coverage and wives’ labor 
supply, by using several panel data methods. Using data from the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY) and the March Annual Demographic Supplements to the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), I compare results obtained from three econometric approaches: 1) 
                                                 
1 According to Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) tabulations of data from the March 2007 
Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS), 27.0 percent of workers in firms with fewer than 10 
employees were covered by their own employer’s health plan in 2006, compared with 65.0 percent of workers 
in firms with 1,000 or more employees (Fronstin 2007). 
2 According to EBRI estimates from the CPS, in 2006, 67.1 percent of workers in the manufacturing sector and 
74.2 percent of workers in the public sector were covered by their own employer’s health plan (Fronstin 2007). 
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cross-sectional estimation of linear probability and probit models of labor supply, which 
(perhaps incorrectly) assumes exogeneity of spousal coverage; 2) cross-sectional 
instrumental variables estimation to handle the potential endogeneity of spousal coverage; 
and 3) panel data methods to account for the marriage selection process and the joint job- 
choice decisions. The findings suggest the negative effect of spousal coverage on labor 
supply found in previous cross-sectional studies results mainly from spousal sorting and 
selection. Once unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for, a relatively smaller estimated 
effect of spousal coverage on wives’ labor supply remains.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the empirical literature on 
the effects of spousal coverage on labor supply. Section 3 describes the econometric 
methodology and discusses how the possible endogeneity of spousal coverage can be 
handled. Section 4 describes the data, Section 5 presents the main results, and Section 6 
concludes. 
2. Previous Research 
Previous research on the effects of husbands’ health insurance coverage on wives’ 
labor supply has relied on the assumption that a husband’s coverage is exogenous to the labor 
supply decisions of his wife (Buchmueller and Valletta 1999; Olson 1998, 2000; Wellington 
and Cobb-Clark 2000). Using cross-sectional data, these studies estimate that husbands’ 
health insurance has significant negative effects on wives’ labor supply. In particular, 
Buchmueller and Valletta (1999) use data from the April 1993 CPS to estimate that a 
husband’s health insurance reduces his wife’s probability of working by 12 percent and her 
hours of work by 36 percent.  
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Buchmueller and Valletta’s key independent variable is whether or not the husband 
has health insurance coverage from an employer (spouse’s insurance). Olson (1998) points 
out that a wife’s labor supply decision is affected not by her husband having his own health 
insurance (that is, whether or not it covers the wife, as used by Buchmueller and Valletta), 
but rather by whether she receives coverage through her husband’s health insurance plan 
(spousal coverage). Still, using data from the March 1993 CPS, Olson finds effects similar to 
those estimated by Buchmueller and Valletta: spousal coverage reduces the probability a wife 
will work by 11 percent and her hours of work by 20 percent.  
Like Olson (1998), Wellington and Cobb-Clark (2000) estimate the labor supply 
effects of spousal coverage. They use the March 1993 CPS data and estimate a 23 percent 
reduction in wives’ labor force participation due to coverage through husbands’ health 
insurance.3 Conditional on working, spousal coverage is estimated to reduce hours of work 
by 17 percent for white wives and 8 percent for black wives. 
Buchmueller and Valletta (1999), Olson (1998, 2000), and Wellington and Cobb-
Clark (2000) all note that the assumption that spousal coverage is exogenous to the wives’ 
labor supply is questionable. Buchmueller and Valletta use a multinomial logit model in an 
attempt to account for the unobserved heterogeneity among married couples. Olson shows 
that the estimated effects are sensitive to econometric specification and the underlying 
exogeneity assumption. Wellington and Cobb-Clark try to sign the bias that would result 
from ignoring the potential endogeneity of spousal coverage. The present study takes a 
                                                 
3 The larger effects estimated by Wellington and Cobb-Clark (2000) may be explained by their inclusion of not 
only spouse’s insurance but also of the key variable, spousal coverage, in labor supply models. Because 
estimated coefficients of spouse’s insurance are positive and significant, the net effects of spousal coverage 
estimated by Wellington and Cobb-Clark (that is, husbands have insurance that covers their wives) are about the 
same magnitude as those estimated by Olson (1998). 
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different approach from earlier work in estimating the effect of spousal coverage on wives’ 
labor supply, particularly along the methodological lines described in the next section. 
3. Empirical Methodology 
 An empirical model that relates the labor supply of married women to their health 
insurance coverage by their husbands’ employer-provided plan can be specified as 
(1)            LSi = δ SPCOVi + WIFEi β1 + HUSBANDi β2 + FAMILYi β3 + vi , 
where LSi is the labor supply of a married woman in family i. The key variable, SPCOVi , 
equals 1 if the wife in family i is covered by her husband’s employer-provided health 
insurance, and 0 otherwise. WIFEi is a vector of wives’ personal characteristics (education, 
experience, experience squared, and race); HUSBANDi denotes husbands’ personal 
characteristics (education, experience, and experience squared); and FAMILYi denotes family 
characteristics (presence of children under age 6, number of children under age 18, region of 
residence, and family nonwage income). Finally,  represents unobservable factors that 
affect the labor supply of wife in family i. 
iv
Estimating Equation (1) by ordinary least squares (or probit) may produce 
inconsistent estimates if unobservable characteristics among married couples that affect 
wives’ labor supply (vi) are systematically related to the availability of husbands’ health 
insurance coverage (SPCOVi). One possible solution to this endogeneity problem is to find 
valid instrumental variables for SPCOVi. To be valid, instruments must be correlated with 
husbands’ employer-provided health insurance but unrelated to unobservables affecting 
wives’ labor supply. Some previous studies have suggested husbands’ job characteristics 
(having a part-time job, working in a small firm, and being self-employed) as instruments for 
SPCOVi (Royalty and Abraham 2006). These job characteristics negatively affect the 
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availability of husbands’ employer-provided health insurance, but they are likely correlated 
with wives’ preferences for work or ability because of the marriage selection process and the 
jointness of job choice decisions. 
Panel data offer additional possibilities to avoid the potential problem of endogeneity. 
As long as unobservables that affect wives’ labor supply remain constant over time, panel 
data may solve the endogeneity problem in Equation (1). For example, an empirical model 
with unobserved effects can be written 
(2) δ=itLS SPCOVit itiititit ucFAMILYHUSBANDWIFE +++++ 321 βββ  ,        
where i indexes families and t indexes time, represents time-invariant unobserved effects 
on wives’ labor supply, and  represents time-varying unobserved effects on wives’ labor 
supply.  
ic
itu
 If we can assume that time-invariant unobserved effects, ci , are uncorrelated with 
each explanatory variable in Equation (2) across all time periods, then Equation (2) becomes 
a random effects (RE) model. Possible time-invariant influences on labor supply include 
differences in ability or in preferences for work. It is likely that both factors are correlated 
with the availability of spousal coverage because of the marriage selection process. In this 
case, the RE estimator is inconsistent, and first-differencing (FD) or fixed-effects (FE) 
methods are required for consistent estimation.4  
FD and FE methods produce consistent estimates of the effect of spousal coverage on 
wives’ labor supply by allowing for arbitrary correlation between unobserved individual 
effects (ci) and the explanatory variables in Equation (2). The consistency of FD and FE 
                                                 
4 The choice between FD and FE depends on the assumptions about time-varying unobserved effects, uit. The 
FE estimator is more efficient if uit are serially correlated, while the FD estimator is more efficient when uit 
follow a random walk.  
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estimators depends on three assumptions: 1) time-varying unobserved effects, , that are 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables across all time periods; 2) sufficient variation in 
spousal coverage over time; and 3) strict exogeneity of explanatory variables.  
itu
The strict exogeneity assumption rules out feedback effects from wives’ labor supply 
to husbands’ health insurance coverage in subsequent years. For example, if husbands switch 
to jobs that would provide health insurance to the family because their wives decide to leave 
the labor force or work shorter hours (and hence are less likely to receive health insurance 
coverage from their own employers), the strict exogeneity assumption is violated, and the FD 
and FE estimators are inconsistent. In this case, one possible approach to consistent 
estimation involves using instrumental variables methods applied after a FD or FE 
transformation, provided valid instruments are available. 
4. Data 
 
To examine the effect of spousal coverage on labor supply decisions of wives, I use 
data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). The NLSY is a sample of 
12,686 young men and women aged 14–22 at the time of the first interview in 1979. Since 
their first interview, they were reinterviewed annually until 1994, and then biennially from 
1996 to the present. Each survey collected information on demographic characteristics, 
employment, income, and family structure. In this study, I use eight interviews of the NLSY: 
1989, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000. These years are selected because the 
questionnaire included detailed questions on the availability and sources of health insurance 
coverage only in these survey years. Specifically, respondents were asked whether they were 
covered by a health plan. If the respondent answered “yes,” the interviewer asked who paid 
for the plan. Responses included current employer, previous employer, spouse’s employer, 
 7
purchased directly, and Medicaid or welfare source. If the respondent was married, the same 
set of questions on health insurance coverage was asked about the wife or husband. These 
questions allow me to identify the wives who had health insurance coverage through their 
husbands’ employer-provided health insurance plan.  
I am able to follow a sample of 20,396 married women from eight interviews of the 
NLSY over 12 years. An observation is included if 1) the respondent had an intact marriage 
from 1989 through 2000, 5 2) both the respondent and her husband were between the ages of 
25 and 64, 3) information on the respondent’s source of health insurance was available, and 
4) the respondent was not covered by public health insurance. The resulting sample, after 
pooling all eight years, includes 12,822 married women from the NLSY. 
A second source of data I use is the March 2000 Annual Demographic Supplement to 
the Current Population Survey (CPS), mainly for comparison purposes. The March CPS 
provides information on demographic characteristics, employment, income, family structure, 
and health insurance that are comparable to those collected in the NLSY. Using information 
on both health insurance coverage and sources of that coverage, I can differentiate between 
wives with and without coverage through their husbands’ employer-provided health 
insurance plan. The criteria used to select the CPS sample are similar to the NLSY: married 
couples aged 25–64 who did not receive public health insurance. The final sample consists of 
19,515 married women from the CPS. 
I examine three alternative measures of labor supply: 1) working, a binary variable 
indicating labor force participation defined as positive hours per week; 2) full-time, a binary 
                                                 
5 To test whether the findings are sensitive to restricting the sample to women who remain in a marriage for 12 
years, I reestimated the models using all married women. The findings are essentially similar (available on 
request). 
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variable indicating that hours worked per week is greater than or equal to 35; and 3) hours, 
usual hours worked per week.  
Table 1 displays the three measures of married women’s labor supply by spousal 
health insurance coverage for both the CPS (left-hand panel) and the NLSY (right-hand 
panel). The top panel of Table 1 shows the labor supply of the entire sample of married 
women (includes both workers and nonworkers), and the bottom panel shows the labor 
supply of working married women (a subsample of the entire sample of married women 
because it includes only women whose weekly hours of work are greater than zero). 
The top left-hand panel in Table 1 suggests potential negative effects of spousal 
coverage on married women’s labor supply in the CPS. Wives who were covered by their 
husbands’ employer-provided health insurance (72.8 percent) were less likely to work than 
wives who were not (83.8 percent). When they worked (bottom left-hand panel of Table 1), 
they were much less likely to work full-time: 65.0 percent of wives with spousal coverage 
worked full-time, compared with 83.4 percent of wives without spousal coverage. 
The negative correlation between married women’s labor supply and spousal 
coverage is also apparent in the NLSY. The fraction working (top right-hand panel of Table 
1) was much lower for wives with spousal coverage (73.8 percent) than for wives without 
spousal coverage (90.1 percent). Among working wives (bottom right-hand panel of Table 
1), those who had spousal coverage were 24.5 percentage points less likely to work full-time 
(57.8 percent versus 82.7 percent). 
Table 2 displays mean characteristics of the entire sample of married women by 
spousal coverage in the CPS (left-hand panel) and the NLSY (right-hand panel). Overall, the 
characteristics of married women in the two data sets are quite similar; however, there are 
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some important differences between wives who have spousal coverage and wives who do 
not. Wives with spousal coverage are more likely to have children under age 6 and to have 
more children under age 18 than wives without spousal coverage. Also, they tend to be 
married to more educated husbands. For example, in the CPS, 64 percent of wives with 
spousal coverage are married to husbands with some college or more, compared with 54 
percent of wives without coverage. (The fractions are 59 percent versus 46 percent in the 
NLSY.) 
Table 3 displays mean characteristics of the sample of working married women by 
spousal coverage in both the CPS and NLSY. The presentation is similar and findings are 
analogous to those in Table 2. 
5. Empirical Findings 
  
 This section presents estimates of the effect of husbands’ health insurance coverage 
on wives’ labor supply from three econometric approaches. These include 1) cross-sectional 
estimates from linear probability and probit models, 2) cross-sectional instrumental variable 
(IV) estimates, and 3) panel estimates. 
5.1 Cross-Sectional LPM and Probit Estimates 
 
 Table 4 displays the estimated marginal effects of spousal coverage on labor force 
participation of married women from linear probability and probit models [Equation (1)]. 
The left-hand panel in Table 4 shows the estimated marginal effects for married women in 
the CPS, and the right-hand panel shows the estimated marginal effects for married women 
in the NLSY. Because marginal effects of control variables are of limited interest, they are 
not reported. The controls included are wives’ personal characteristics (education, 
experience, experience squared, and race); husbands’ personal characteristics (education, 
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experience, and experience squared); and family characteristics (presence of children under 
age 6, number of children under age 18, region of residence, and family nonwage income). 
 The marginal effect of spousal coverage on labor force participation is essentially 
similar in size and statistical significance in both models and both data sets. The estimated 
marginal effect, about −0.11, suggests that spousal health insurance coverage reduces wives’ 
probability of participation by 11 percentage points. This represents a reduction of 12 percent 
compared with wives who do not have spousal coverage. 
These participation estimates are very similar to those obtained by Buchmueller and 
Valletta (1999) and by Olson (1998), who estimate that spousal coverage reduced married 
women’s labor supply by 12 percent and 11 percent, respectively. However, they are smaller 
than the 23 percent reduction (19.5 percentage points) estimated by Wellington and Cobb-
Clark (2000). 
Table 5 displays the estimated marginal effects of spousal coverage on full-time 
employment of working married women from linear probability and probit models. The 
estimates are conditional on positive labor force participation. The controls used in the 
estimation are the same as those in Table 4. In both the CPS and NLSY, the estimated 
marginal effect of spousal coverage is about −0.16, which suggests that the probability of 
working full-time is 16 percentage points (22 percent) lower for working wives with spousal 
coverage than for working wives without spousal coverage.  
5.2 Cross-Sectional IV Estimates 
Table 6 shows the coefficients on spousal coverage in three labor supply models 
estimated by OLS and 2SLS using data from the CPS. The controls included are the same as 
before (see the table notes). Again, three alternative measures of labor supply are used as  
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dependent variables: 1) a binary variable indicating labor force participation (working), 2) a 
binary variable indicating hours worked per week is greater than or equal to 35 (full-time), 
and 3) usual hours worked per week (hours). 
The instruments for spousal coverage are a dummy variable indicating whether the 
husband is self-employed and a dummy variable indicating whether the husband works part-
time. This choice of instruments is based on the assumption that a wife’s coverage by her 
husband’s employer-provided health insurance is negatively correlated with the husband’s 
having a part-time job or being self-employed, but unrelated to unobservable factors 
affecting the wife’s labor supply decisions. The latter of these assumptions is tenuous 
because the husband’s having a part-time job or being self-employed is likely correlated with 
the wife’s preferences for work if there is spousal sorting and selection. However, the 
purpose is to see whether an instrumental variable approach that has been used in the past 
yields plausible findings. 
The top panel of Table 6 displays the estimated effects of spousal coverage on the 
participation of all married women. The OLS estimate repeats the main finding from Table 4. 
The 2SLS estimate is essentially similar (−0.091). As expected, the standard error of the 
2SLS estimate is larger than the OLS standard error (0.024 versus 0.006), but the estimate is 
still significant at conventional levels (p-value = 0.000). 
In the model of working married women’s full-time work (middle panel of Table 6), 
the OLS estimate is −0.153, which suggests that spousal coverage reduces wives’ probability 
of full-time work by 15.3 percentage points (a 21.9 percent reduction). But the estimate is 
quite different when we use 2SLS: the estimated spousal effect is now 0.236 (p-value = 
0.000). Similarly, in the hours equation for working married women (bottom panel of Table 
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6), the OLS estimate (−3.772) suggests that wives with spousal coverage work almost 4 
hours less per week than wives without spousal coverage (p-value = 0.000), but 2SLS 
estimate is 3.413 with a p-value of 0.000.   
Table 7 shows the estimated effect of spousal coverage on labor supply for women in 
the NLSY. The presentation is similar to that of Table 6. Because information on whether the 
husband is self-employed is not available in the NLSY, husbands’ part-time work status is 
the only available instrument for spousal coverage. This, however, does not affect the main 
finding: once again, the OLS and 2SLS estimates differ in significant ways.  
That OLS and 2SLS estimations produce such different results suggests the 
importance of testing for the endogeneity of spousal coverage in the labor supply equations. 
The regression-based Hausman test that compares OLS and 2SLS estimates (see Wooldridge 
2002, Section 6.2.1) is well-suited for this. Heteroskedasticity-robust Hausman test statistics 
are given in both Tables 6 and 7 (see “Hausman test”). The test statistic suggests strong 
evidence of endogeneity of spousal coverage in the three labor supply models for both 
samples in both data sets (p-values = 0.000). This suggests in turn that 2SLS is needed for 
consistent estimation provided that the instruments are valid, which is what we consider next. 
Because the 2SLS estimation in the CPS uses two instruments for spousal coverage, 
there is one overidentifying restriction. The overidentifying restriction can thus be tested in 
the model estimated using the CPS data, but not when using the NLSY. In order to determine 
the validity of the instruments, I use the Sargan statistic. This is calculated as N×R-squared 
from a regression of the IV residuals on the full set of instruments (Wooldridge 2002, Section 
6.2.2; Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2003). The null hypothesis is that the variables used as 
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instruments for spousal coverage (husband’s self-employment and part-time work) are 
uncorrelated with unobservables affecting wives’ labor supply. 
Table 6 displays the results. In the model of married women’s participation, the 
Sargan test rejects the hypothesis of instrument validity (p-value = 0.039). For the sample of 
working married women, the instruments pass the overidentification test in the full-time 
work equation, which suggests that the instruments are valid (p-value = 0.728), but in the 
hours equation, we reject the validity assumption of the instruments at the 10 percent 
significance level (p-value = 0.089). 
That the Sargan test produces inconsistent results is not actually surprising because it 
evaluates the entire set of overidentifying restrictions but requires that at least some of the 
instruments be valid. However, as discussed before, using variables for husband’s work 
status as instruments for spousal coverage raises concerns because the husband’s having a 
part-time job or being self-employed is likely correlated with the wife’s preferences for work 
due to spousal sorting and selection. 
Given that cross-sectional IV estimation does not provide a solution to the 
endogeneity problem of spousal coverage, I now turn to panel estimates.  
5.3 Panel Estimates 
Table 8 shows estimates of the spousal coverage effect using the NLSY. Unlike the 
estimates in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, these estimates take advantage of the panel nature of the 
NLSY and use the 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000 interviews of the 
NLSY. Table 8 displays estimates of four different models: 1) pooled ordinary least squares 
(POLS), 2) random effects (RE), 3) fixed effects (FE), and 4) first differencing (FD). The 
POLS and RE models include a full set of year dummies, wives’ personal characteristics 
 14
(education, experience, experience squared, and race); husbands’ personal characteristics 
(education, experience, and experience squared); and family characteristics (presence of 
children under age 6, number of children under age 18, region of residence, and family non-
wage income) as controls. The FE and FD models include the same controls, except race, 
which is not time-varying. 
The POLS estimates of the effect of spousal coverage are given in column 1 of Table 
8. The reported standard errors are robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. The 
estimated effect of spousal coverage is negative and statistically significant in the three labor 
supply models for both samples of married women. The results suggest that married women 
with spousal coverage are 9.4 percentage points (14 percent) less likely to be working, and 
those who work are 18.4 percentage points (28 percent) less likely to work full time. In the 
hours equation for working married women, the estimated effect of spousal coverage is 
−3.790 (p-value = 0.000), which suggests that married women with spousal coverage work 
almost 4 hours less per week (a 13 percent reduction) than married women without spousal 
coverage.  
Column 2 in Table 8 displays the RE estimates. The estimated spousal coverage 
effects are still negative and statistically significant, but they are smaller in absolute value 
than the POLS estimates. Thus, it seems that controlling for random unobserved effects 
(assuming they are uncorrelated with explanatory variables) diminishes the negative effect of 
spousal coverage on wives’ labor supply. 
The FE model in column 3 produces estimated coefficients for spousal coverage that 
are even smaller in absolute value. The FE estimates are about half the size of the RE 
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estimates. For example, spousal coverage is estimated to reduce weekly hours worked by 1.6 
hours for working married women, compared with 2.5 hours in the RE model. 
Because the key assumption underlying the consistency of RE is whether unobserved 
effects and the explanatory variables are correlated, I test this assumption using a Hausman 
test that compares random and fixed effects estimates (see Wooldridge 2002, Section 10.7.3). 
The test strongly rejects (p-value = 0.000) the hypothesis that unobserved effects are 
uncorrelated with spousal coverage in the three labor supply models for both samples of 
married women. This suggests that the random effects estimators are inconsistent but the 
fixed effects estimator is consistent conditional on strict exogeneity of the explanatory 
variables. 
Finally, estimates obtained using FD are given in column 4 of Table 8. The FD 
estimates are even smaller in absolute value than the FE estimates but generally the same 
order of magnitude. To choose between FE and FD, I test whether the differenced errors are 
serially uncorrelated. The results indicate that there is substantial negative serial correlation 
in the differenced errors ( ≈ρˆ −0.30 with p-value = 0.000), suggesting fixed effects is more 
efficient than first differencing (Wooldridge 2002, Section 10.7.1). 
As mentioned above, consistency of FE estimates requires that spousal coverage be 
strictly exogenous with respect to time-varying unobserved effects—uit in Equation (2), after 
accounting for the individual effect—ci in Equation (2). To test for feedback effects from 
wives’ labor supply to future values of spousal coverage, I generate the lead of the spousal 
coverage variable and use it as a regressor in the FE model (Wooldridge 2002, Section 
10.7.1). The estimated leads of spousal coverage are insignificant in the three labor supply 
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models for both samples of married women. This suggests that there is no evidence against 
strict exogeneity of spousal coverage after netting out the individual effect using the FE.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The empirical analysis in this paper yields three main findings. First, there is strong 
evidence that spousal coverage is endogenous to the labor supply of married women (Section 
5.2). This results from the simultaneity of wives’ labor supply decisions and the health 
insurance status of their husbands. Second, cross-sectional instrumental variables estimation 
does not provide a viable solution to the endogeneity problem (Section 5.2). The close link 
between health insurance and labor supply makes it difficult to identify suitable instruments 
that are correlated with wives’ coverage by their husbands’ health insurance, but unrelated to 
wives’ labor supply decisions. This is confirmed by the results of the test for overidentifying 
restrictions (see “Sargan test,” presented in Table 6), which reject the hypothesis of 
instrument validity. Third, once unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for, spousal coverage 
has a smaller negative effect on wives’ labor supply (Section 5.3).  
Specifically, it appears that controlling for sorting and selection of married couples 
diminishes the negative effect of spousal coverage found in cross-sections. The FE estimates 
in Table 8 suggest that spousal coverage reduces wives’ probability of participation by 7.7 
percent. Conditional on working, spousal coverage is estimated to reduce the probability that 
wives work full-time by 15 percent, and to reduce their hours of work by 6.5 percent. In 
contrast, the cross-sectional estimates, which are similar to those estimated by Buchmueller 
and Valletta (1999), Olson (1998, 2000), and Wellington and Cobb-Clark (2000), suggest 
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that spousal coverage reduces wives’ probability of participation by 14 percent, working 
wives’ probability of full-time work by 28 percent, and their hours of work by 13 percent. 
The results have potentially important implications for the debate over health care 
reform in the United States. A major goal of most proposed reforms is to expand access to 
health care and health insurance coverage. Doing this generally entails uncoupling health 
insurance from employment, as would happen under universal single-payer health care, or at 
least weakening the link, as occurs under a plan like that adopted by Massachusetts in 2007. 
The question is whether the divorce of health insurance from employment would reduce the 
labor supply of workers who currently work (or have adjusted their work hours) so as to 
acquire health insurance. The results of the present analysis suggest that universal coverage 
would reduce the labor supply of married women, but not as significantly as estimated by 
previous studies. 
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Table 1
Labor Supply of Married Women by Spousal Health Insurance Coverage, 2000 CPS and NLSY
CPS NLSY
Wife Wife Wife Wife
covered not covered covered not covered
All married women
Working (%) 72.8 83.8 73.8 90.1
(weekly hours>0)
Full-time (%) 47.3 69.9 42.7 74.5
(weekly hours>=35)
Hours (weeks) 25.0 32.5 25.7 36.1
Number of observations 10,019 9,496 1,076 1,113
Working married women
Working (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(weekly hours>0)
Full-time (%) 65.0 83.4 57.8 82.7
(wee y hours>=35) 
Hours (weeks) 34.4 38.8 34.9 40.1
Number of observations 7,337 7,907 807 1,010
NOTE: The data are from the March 2000 Annual Demographic Supplement to the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) and the 2000 interview of the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY). Means are tabulated using CPS March Supplement and NLSY weights. 
llege
Table 2
Summary Statistics for Married Women by Spousal Health Insurance Coverage, 2000 CPS and 
NLSY
CPS NLSY
Wife Wife not Wife Wife not
Variable All covered covered All covered covered
Spousal coverage 0.52 1 0 0.52 1 0
(0.50) (0) (0) (0.50) (0) (0)
Labor supply measures
Working 0.78 0.73 0.84 0.82 0.74 0.90
(0.41) (0.45) (0.37) (0.39) (0.44) (0.30)
Full-time 0.58 0.47 0.70 0.58 0.43 0.74
(0.49) (0.50) (0.46) (0.49) (0.49) (0.44)
Hours 28.61 25.04 32.55 30.67 25.74 36.10
(18.35) (18.60) (17.25) (18.94) (20.25) (15.67)
Education
  Less than high school 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.29) (0.25) (0.32) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21)
  High school 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.40 0.38 0.42
(0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
  Some college 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.23 0.25
(0.45) (0.46) (0.44) (0.43) (0.42) (0.44)
  Co 0 21. 0 21. 0 20. 0 18. 0 20. 0 15.
(0.41) (0.41) (0.40) (0.38) (0.40) (0.35)
  More than college 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.13 -0.14
(0.29) (0.28) (0.30) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34)
Experience 22.57 22.21 22.96 19.74 19.74 19.75
(10.08) (9.64) (10.52) (3.41) (3.47) (3.34)
Race
White 0.88 0.89 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.84
(0.33) (0.31) (0.35) (0.34) (0.31) (0.37)
  Black 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.09
(0.26) (0.24) (0.27) (0.26) (0.23) (0.29)
Other 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06
(0.22) (0.21) (0.24) (0.23) (0.21) (0.25)
Region
  Northeast 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.15
(0.39) (0.41) (0.38) (0.38) (0.40) (0.36)
  Midwest 0.25 0.27 0.22 0.27 0.32 0.23
(0.43) (0.45) (0.41) (0.45) (0.47) (0.42)
(continued)
College
Table 2 (continued)
CPS NLSY
Wife Wife not Wife Wife not
Variable All covered covered All covered covered
  South 0.35 0.32 0.38 0.37 0.31 0.43
(0.48) (0.47) (0.49) (0.48) (0.46) (0.50)
  West 0.21 0.20 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.18
(0.41) (0.40) (0.42) (0.38) (0.37) (0.38)
Presence of children under age 6 0.24 0.27 0.20 0.27 0.30 0.23
(0.43) (0.45) (0.40) (0.44) (0.46) (0.42)
Number of children under age 18 1.09 1.24 0.92 1.83 2.02 1.61
(1.19) (1.20) (1.15) (1.16) (1.12) (1.16)
Family nonwage income 4,089 4,468 3,671 5,277 6,080 4,415
(12,851) (13,298) (12,328) (4,111) (4,167) (3,871)
Husband's education
Less than high school 0.11 0.07 0.15 0.08 0.06 0.10
(0.31) (0.25) (0.35) (0.27) (0.24) (0.31)
High school 0.30 0.29 0.32 0.39 0.35 0.44
(0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50)
Some college 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.22
(0.44) (0.44) (0.43) (0.41) (0.40) (0.41)
0 21. 0 22. 0 19. 0 17. 0 21. 0 12.
(0.41) (0.42) (0.39) (0.38) (0.41) (0.33)
More than college 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.15 0.17 0.12
(0.33) (0.35) (0.30) (0.35) (0.38) (0.32)
Husband's experience 24.38 23.78 25.04 21.64 21.08 22.27
(10.29) (9.84) (10.73) (5.78) (5.45) (6.06)
Number of observations 19,515 10,019 9,496 2,189 1,076 1,113
NOTE: See Table 1. Figures represent rates except for four categories: "Hours," "Experience," "Family 
nonwage income," and "Husband's experience." "Experience" and "Husband's experience" represent 
years. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 3
Summary Statistics for Working Married Women by Spousal Health Insurance Coverage, 2000 
CPS and NLSY
CPS NLSY
Wife Wife not Wife Wife not
Variable All covered covered All covered covered
Spousal coverage 0.49 1 0 0.47 1 0
(0.50) (0) (0) (0.50) (0) (0)
Labor supply measures
Working 1 1 1 1 1 1
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Full-time 0.74 0.65 0.83 0.71 0.58 0.83
(0.44) (0.48) (0.37) (0.45) (0.49) (0.38)
Hours 36.68 34.41 38.85 37.60 34.89 40.06
(11.66) (12.36) (10.50) (13.37) (15.38) (10.67)
Education
  Less than high school 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.25) (0.22) (0.28) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20)
  High school 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.41 0.40 0.41
(0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
  Some college 0.29 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.25
(0.46) (0.46) (0.45) (0.43) (0.43) (0.44)
  Co 0 22. 0 22. 0 21. 0 17. 0 18. 0 15.
(0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.37) (0.39) (0.36)
  More than college 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.14
(0.31) (0.29) (0.32) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35)
Experience 22.03 21.72 22.32 19.71 19.73 19.68
(9.66) (9.15) (10.12) (3.41) (3.49) (3.34)
Race
White 0.87 0.89 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.84
(0.33) (0.32) (0.35) (0.35) (0.32) (0.37)
  Black 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.10
(0.27) (0.26) (0.28) (0.27) (0.24) (0.30)
Other 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06
(0.21) (0.20) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.25)
Region
  Northeast 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.16
(0.39) (0.41) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.37)
  Midwest 0.26 0.28 0.23 0.28 0.33 0.23
(0.44) (0.45) (0.42) (0.45) (0.47) (0.42)
(continued)
College
Table 3 (continued)
CPS NLSY
Wife Wife not Wife Wife not
Variable All covered covered All covered covered
  South 0.35 0.32 0.38 0.37 0.32 0.42
(0.48) (0.46) (0.49) (0.48) (0.47) (0.49)
  West 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.17 0.16 0.18
(0.40) (0.39) (0.41) (0.38) (0.37) (0.39)
Presence of children under age 6 0.22 0.24 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.21
(0.41) (0.43) (0.39) (0.42) (0.44) (0.41)
Number of children under age 18 1.04 1.19 0.89 1.71 1.90 1.55
(1.13) (1.14) (1.10) (1.12) (1.08) (1.13)
Family nonwage income 3,990 4,428 3,572 4,799 5,545 4,146
(12,457) (13,100) (11,796) (3,672) (3,737) (3,488)
Husband's education
Less than high school 0.09 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.10
(0.29) (0.24) (0.33) (0.27) (0.23) (0.30)
High school 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.41 0.37 0.44
(0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50)
Some college 0.27 0.29 0.26 0.22 0.22 0.23
(0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.42) (0.41) (0.42)
0 21. 0 22. 0 20. 0 16. 0 21. 0 12.
(0.41) (0.41) (0.40) (0.37) (0.40) (0.33)
More than college 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.11
(0.33) (0.35) (0.30) (0.34) (0.36) (0.31)
Husband's experience 24.05 23.54 24.54 21.76 21.17 22.31
(9.99) (9.43) (10.48) (5.75) (5.27) (6.11)
Number of observations 15,244 7,337 7,907 1,817 807 1,010
NOTE: See Table 1. Figures represent rates except for four categories: "Hours," "Experience," "Family 
nonwage income," and "Husband's experience." "Experience" and "Husband's experience" represent 
years. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 4
Linear Probability and Probit Estimates of Married Women's Labor Force Participation, 
2000 CPS and NLSY
Dependent variable: working CPS NLSY
Variable LPM Probit LPM Probit
Spousal coverage −0.103 −0.109 −0.106 −0.115
(0.006) (0.006) (0.018) (0.017)
Number of observations 19,515 19,515 1,763 1,763
R -squared 0.103 0.099 0.141 0.161
NOTE: The data are from the March 2000 Annual Demographic Supplement to the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) and the 2000 interview of the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY). Figures are estimated changes in the probability of labor force participation 
from linear probability and probit models. All models include wives’ personal characteristics, 
husbands’ personal characteristics, and family characteristics as controls. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. The R -squared for the probits is the pseudo-R -squared.
Table 5
Linear Probability and Probit Estimates of Working Married Women's Full-Time Work, 
2000 CPS and NLSY
D d t bl f ll tiepen en  var a e: u - me
Variable LPM Probit LPM Probit
Spousal coverage −0.153 −0.156 −0.170 −0.174
(0.007) (0.007) (0.023) (0.024)
Number of observations 15,244 15,244 1,473 1,473
R-squared 0.083 0.076 0.142 0.131
NOTE: The data are from the March 2000 Annual Demographic Supplement to the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) and the 2000 interview of the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY). Figures are estimated changes in the probability of full-time work from linear 
probability and probit models. All models include wives’ personal characteristics, husbands’ 
personal characteristics, and family characteristics as controls. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. The R -squared for the probits is the pseudo-R -squared.
Working married women
Table 6
OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Spousal Coverage on Labor Supply: 2000 CPS 
All married women
Dependent variable: working OLS 2SLS
Spousal coverage −0.103 −0.091
(0.006) (0.024)
First stage F -statistic 675.38
   [p -value] [0.000]
Hausman test −0.103
   [p -value] [0.000]
Sargan statistic 4.269
   [p -value] [0.039]
Working married women
Dependent variable: full-time OLS 2SLS
Spousal coverage −0.153 0.236
(0.007) (0.033)
First stage F -statistic 575.42
   [p -value] [0.000]
Hausman test −0.177
   [p -value] [0.007]
Sargan statistic 0.121
   [p -value] [0.728]
  
Dependent variable: hours OLS 2SLS
Spousal coverage −3.722 3.413
(0.186) (0.934)
First stage F -statistic 575.42
   [p -value] [0.000]
Hausman test −4.160
   [p -value] [0.000]
Sargan statistic 2.889
   [p -value] [0.089]
NOTE: The data are from the March 2000 CPS. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. In brackets 
are p -values. All models include wives’ personal characteristics, husbands’ personal characteristics, 
and family characteristics as controls. The instruments for spousal coverage include a dummy variable 
indicating whether the husband is self-employed and a dummy variable indicating whether the husband 
is working part-time. The first stage F -statistic is a test statistic for joint significance of the instruments 
in the first stage regression of spousal coverage on the exogenous variables and instruments. The 
Hausman test is a regression-based Hausman test. The Sargan statistic is a test of overidentifying 
restrictions. Sample sizes are 19,515 (all married women) and 15,244 (working married women). 
(0 711) (11 503)
Table 7
OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Spousal Coverage on Labor Supply: 2000 NLSY
All married women
Dependent variable: working OLS 2SLS
Spousal coverage −0.106 0.083
(0.018) (0.288)
First stage t -statistic −2.820
   [p -value] [0.005]
Hausman test −0.103
   [p -value] [0.000]
Working married women
Dependent variable: full-time OLS 2SLS
Spousal coverage −0.169 0.094
(0.023) (0.331)
First stage t-statistic −2.980
   [p -value] [0.003]
Hausman test −0.171
   [p -value] [0.000]
Working married women
Dependent variable: hours OLS 2SLS
Spousal coverage −3.082 11.740
. .
First stage t -statistic −2.980
   [p -value] [0.003]
Hausman test −2.765
   [p -value] [0.000]
NOTE: The data are from the 2000 interview of the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. In brackets are p -values. All models include wives’ 
personal characteristics, husbands’ personal characteristics, and family characteristics as controls. The 
instrument for spousal coverage is a dummy variable indicating whether the husband is working part-
time. The first stage t -statistic is a test statistic for the significance of the instrument in the first stage 
regression of spousal coverage on the exogenous variables and the instrument. The Hausman test is a 
regression-based Hausman test. Sample sizes are 1,763 (all married women) and 1,472 (working married 
women).
Table 8 
Panel Estimates of the Effect of Spousal Coverage on Labor Supply: 1989-2000 NLSY
All married women
Dependent variable: working (1) POLS (2) RE (3) FE (4) FD
Spousal coverage −0.094 −0.051 −0.026 −0.005
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Hausman test 125.16
[p -value] [0.000]
Strict exogeneity test −0.020
[p -value] [0.120]
Number of observations 12,888 12,888 12,888 8,543
Working married women
Dependent variable: full-time (1) POLS (2) RE (3) FE (4) FD
Spousal coverage −0.184 −0.132 −0.088 −0.052
(0.012) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012)
Hausman test 99.79
[p -value] [0.000]
Strict exogeneity test −0.036
[p -value] [0.280]
Number of observations 10,584 10,584 10,584 7,072
Working married women
Dependent variable: hours (1) POLS (2) RE (3) FE (4) FD
Spousal coverage −3.790 −2.504 −1.596 −0.989
(0.318) (0.238) (0.338) (0.380)
Hausman test 82.81
 [p -value] [0.000]
Strict exogeneity test −0.883
[p -value] [0.196]
Number of observations 10,584 10,584 10,584 7,072
NOTE: The data are from the 1989–2000 interviews of the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. In brackets are p -values. POLS and RE 
models include a full set of year dummies, wives’ personal characteristics, husbands’ personal 
characteristics, and family characteristics as controls. FE and FD models include the same 
controls, except race, which is not time-varying. Hausman test is based on the comparison of 
estimates obtained from the RE and FE models. Strict exogeneity test is the test for feedback 
effects from dependent variable to future values of explanatory variables.
